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INTRODUCTION
Nowadays it is not unusual for women to have their 
first child in their thirties. Figure 1 shows the trend in 
mean age at first birth in a sample of European coun-
tries. Starting from the 1980s, in almost all countries 
there is a sharp increase in the age of first motherhood. 
Multiple factors have been advanced to explain this 
trend. Education is surely an important one. Women’s 
educational levels have been increasing at a faster 
pace than those of men in the last decades. Female 
education has a twofold delaying effect on age at first 
birth. The first is an “incapacitation effect”, because 
enrolment in and completion of education are activ-
ities generally incompatible with childrearing. The 
second is an “aspiration effect”, because one reason 
why individuals invest in their human capital (includ-
ing inter alia on the job training) is to reap economic 
returns in the labour market (Becker 1994). It may be 
the case that these returns are maximised for women 
if they delay motherhood. Consistent with this view, 
two main reasons for postponing having children have 
been stressed in the economic literature: the career 
planning motive and the consumption smoothing 
motive (Gustafsson 2001). The career planning motive 
posits that women have their first child when mother-
hood is likely not to represent an obstacle any more to 
their full realisation in the labour market. This typically 
happens when they are at the apex of their careers or 
have little prospect of further promotion. The salience 
of this motive depends of course on the level of gender 
discrimination existing in the labour market and on the 
absence of labour market institutions favouring the 
full conciliation of family and work. The consumption 
smoothing motive is strictly related to the previous 
one, as it states that women give birth when children 
are unlikely to negatively impact household consump-
tion levels, i.e. households dispose of enough income 
and wealth to smooth consumption. A slightly different 
interpretation of this motive is that women (and par-
ents in general) wait to have children until they are sure 
to have enough resources to grant them the best life 
opportunities, or in more technical terms when they 
have the financial resources to invest in child quality 
(Becker and Lewis 1973). The rising competitiveness of 
the economic environment and the slower economic 
growth prevailing in most developed countries com-
pared to the past may indeed require greater invest-
ments in child quality.
Besides labour market reasons for postponing the 
first birth, it must be noted that economic, demo-
graphic and sociological literature has stressed many 
other factors (see Sobotka 2004), such as, just to men-
tion a few, the diffusion of contraception (giving 
increasing power to women), changes in sexual habits 
and social norms, and the development of assisted 
reproduction technologies, which potentially enable 
women to become mothers at older ages with respect 
to the past while focusing on their careers in their 30s 
and 40s.
The remaining article develops as follows. In the 
next section, we stress our main contribution to the 
existing literature. Then we describe our empirical 
strategy and the data used in the empirical analysis. 
The main findings are commented on in the results sec-
tion, and summarised in the conclusion.
EXISTING LITERATURE 
The existing literature generally shows a positive asso-
ciation between postponement of first childbirth and 
labour market outcomes (see Bratti 2015, for a review). 
Delaying motherhood positively affects both women’s 
labour incomes (e.g,, Miller 2011; Karimi 2014; Herr 
2016; Leung at al. 2016) and labour force participation 
(e.g., Troske et al. 2013; Bratti 2014; Mølland 2016).
While evidence on the “postponement premia”, i.e. 
the increase in wages or employability associated with 
late motherhood, is already widespread for a number 
of countries, our contribution to the existing literature 
is twofold. First, we provide comparative evidence for a 
large set of European countries using very homogene-
ous data from the European Union Statistics on Income 
and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) survey. Second, and 
most important, we make an attempt to relate coun-
try-specific estimates of “postponement premia” to 
indicators summarising the policy and cultural con-
texts prevailing in the different EU countries. 
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
We use EU-SILC data, described in the following sec-
tion, to estimate country-specific “postponement 
premia” using the following equation
 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
 
𝛼𝛼𝛼1𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖  
(1)
where Yijt is an outcome variable referring to women’s 
labour market performance (gross hourly wage); A1Bi  is 
a woman’s age at first birth; Xit is a vector of control var-
iables including age, level of education grouped in 
three categories (low, medium and high); migrant sta-
tus and age of the youngest child. (We also estimated 
models controlling for current partners’ presence, level 
of education and age, and results were only marginally 
different.). Djt is country-year fixed effects, which cap-
ture, among others, differences in business cycles; ϵijt is 
an idiosyncratic error term. Our parameters of interest 
are the country-specific estimates of “postponement 
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premia” (α1j). Equation (1) is estimated using Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS). A positive (negative) sign on α1j 
means that postponement of first birth has a positive 
(negative) effect on wage in country j. We expect “post-
ponement premia” to be positive, at least in countries 
in which family and work are scarcely compatible. In 
particular, postponing motherhood may generate a 
double dividend on mothers’ careers. First, women 
delay a potential source of gender discrimination in 
both hiring and career promotion. We label this effect 
as the pure “career planning effect”. Second, starting 
childbearing later will probably entail a lower number 
of children (in demography the so called “postpone-
ment effect”, see Bratti and Tatsiramos 2012), also 
improving labour market outcomes via reduced fertil-
ity (see, for instance, the discussion in Miller 2011). In 
equation (1) we do not control for the number of chil-
dren and estimate the gross “postponement premia” 
capturing both effects.1
Although the recent literature has emphasised 
endogeneity issues related to pregnancy postpone-
ment (i.e. delayers may have unobservable characteris-
tics also affecting labour market outcomes, such as 
“work orientation”) potentially biasing the OLS esti-
mates (Miller 2011; Bratti and Cavalli 2014), our main 
interest lies in relating the estimates of the “postpone-
ment premia” to country-level policy and cultural fea-
tures. In order to do so, we estimate the following 
equation
  
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
 
𝛼𝛼𝛼1𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖   (2)
where â1j is the OLS estimates of the “postponement 
premia”; Characteristicj is a summary indicator of a 
country’s policy or cultural orientation during the esti-
mation period; and ui an error term. In each estimate of 
equation (2), only one country characteristic is included 
at the time to avoid multicollinearity problems. We 
maintain that, conditional on country-year fixed effects 
controlled for in equation (1), countries’ features are 
less likely to be correlated with unobservable individ-
ual characteristics, which then enter the error term of 
the second-step of our analysis (ui). The estimates are 
weighted by the inverse of the standard errors of s – 
using Weighted Least Squares (WLS) – since the depend-
ent variable is generated by a regression. The sign and 
magnitude of the estimate of the parameter ϐ1 indi-
cates whether “postponement premia” are on average 
positively or negatively affected by some specific coun-
tries’ attributes.
DATA
The data used for the estimation of equation (1) are a 
pooled sample of the cross-sectional version of EU-SILC 
from 2004 to 2014. 2 The EU-SILC currently covers the 
1  We also estimated models including the number of children. The “postpo-
nement premia” are generally smaller in size, showing that part of the labour 
market advantage of giving birth later is mediated by lower fertility.
2  http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-stati-
stics-on-income-and-living-conditions.
EU28 members and adjacent countries such as Norway, 
Switzerland and Iceland. It collects information on all 
members of the sampled households, and contains 
detailed information on the respondents’ current eco-
nomic and social conditions, with the main focus on 
income, poverty, living conditions and social exclusion. 
As this survey is not designed for demographic analysis, 
fertility data (age at first birth) had to be reconstructed 
from household information, relying on the “own child 
method” (OCM) (Bordone et al. 2009; Coleman and 
Dubuc 2010; Klesment et al. 2014) matching children 
and mothers within households. One drawback is that 
information is limited to children still living in the 
household, thus we have no information on dates of 
birth of children who have already left the parental 
home and do not belong to the surveyed household 
anymore. To overcome this limitation we focus on 
young women, so that their children are more likely to 
be still living in the parental household. We also decided 
not to consider teenage mothers, as they represent 
quite a different category of women. Thus, our working 
sample is composed of all mothers, aged between 18 
and 45, at the time of the survey, for whom we observe 
having their first child between age 18 and 40. 
We only include mothers who are currently work-
ing as employees, excluding self-employed mothers, 
and mothers whose income comes exclusively from 
dependent work, excluding employees who also have 
self-employment incomes. 
To explain country differences in the impact of age 
at first motherhood on subsequent labour market out-
comes (equation 2), we consider three main groups of 
indicators: the first one is composed of indicators 
which describe the social and economic conditions 
faced by women; the second one reflects culture and 
values of the analysed countries; the last one contains 
composite indexes which put together different dimen-
sions related to gender equality and family-friendly 
policies. When possible, we consider the average value 
of the indicators over the years 2004-2014. If not possi-
ble, we consider the average value over the available 
years. 
A) SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS
• Strictness of employment protection. It expresses the 
rigidity of the labour market in terms of costs related 
to individual dismissals in regular contracts [Source: 
OECD Indicators for Employment protection]. 
• The unadjusted Gender Pay Gap (GPG). It is calculated 
as the ratio between the average gross hourly earn-
ings of female paid employees and the average gross 
hourly earnings of male paid employees, multiplied 
by 100 [Source: The Structure of Earnings Survey, 
Eurostat].
• Part-time jobs diffusion. It is calculated as the share 
of women of age 20-64 working on a part-time basis 
[Source: LFS, Eurostat; available in the years 2007-
2014 only].
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• Parental leave arrangements. It is the total number of 
paid weeks to mothers, including both maternity 
and parental leave [Source: CESifo database; availa-
ble in the year 2015 only].
• Early formal childcare availability. It is calculated as 
the proportion of children younger than three years 
old enrolled in formal childcare [Source: EU-SILC, 
Eurostat; available years 2005-2014 only].
B) CULTURE AND VALUES INDICATORS
• Pre-school children suffer with working mothers / 
Being a housewife is as fulfilling as working / When 
jobs are scarce men should have the priority over 
women. We calculate the percentage of male and 
female respondents who agree and strongly agree 
with the above statements [Source: own elaboration 
from the European Value survey; available in year 
2008 only]. 
• Age norm. It is calculated as the percentage of 
respondents stating that the ideal age to become a 
mother is after 30 [Source: own elaboration from the 
“Timing of life” section of the European Social Sur-
vey; available in year 2008 only]. 
• Leave - sharing. It is calculated as the percentage of 
respondents to the question: “Consider a couple 
who both work full-time and now have a new-born 
child. Both are in a similar work situation and are eli-
gible for paid leave. How should this paid leave 
period be divided between the mother and the 
father?” who respond “The leave should be used 
entirely by the mother” or “The leave should be used 
mostly by the mother” [Source: International Social 
Survey Programme; available in year 2012 only].
• Religious participation. It is calculated as the per-
centage of respondents attending religious services 
at least once per week. [Source: European value sur-
vey; available in year 2008 only].
C) COMPOSITE INDEXES
• The family-friendly society index “Target field index”. 
It summarises five sub-indicators: high birth rate, 
high female employment, high level of education, 
low poverty of families and gender equality; it takes 
values from 0 to 100 [Source: CESifo; available in year 
2009 only].
• The family-friendly society index “Fields of action 
index”. It summarises three sub-indicators: “finan-
cial support”, which describes the degree of trans-
fers, tax allowances or continuation of payments for 
families; “infrastructure”, which describes the cover-
age of formal childcare; and “time”, which describes 
the work-life balance, the efficiency of the educa-
tional system and tax system for the work-life bal-
ance; it takes values from 0 to 100 [Source: CESifo; 
available in year 2009 only]. 
• The Gender Development index (GDI). It measures 
gender gaps in human development achievements 
by accounting for disparities between women and 
men in three basic dimensions of human develop-
ment – health, knowledge and living standard – using 
the same component indicators as in the Human 
Development Index (HDI). It is a direct measure of 
gender gap showing the female HDI as a percentage 
of the male HDI [Source: UN; available years 2005-
2014 only].
Obviously, many indicators are correlated among each 
other, and groups of countries may share similar values 
of these indicators. Countries with high availability of 
formal childcare are also the ones where part-time jobs 
are more diffused. In contrast, countries with longer 
parental leaves are the ones where fewer part-time jobs 
are available. These correlations identify different fam-
ily-work strategies: the diffusion of the part-time option 
is related to the necessity to return to the labour mar-
ket relatively early since formal childcare hardly covers 
a full-time work-day, and the mother is willing to spend 
time with the young child; on the other hand, where 
parental leaves are longer, mothers are supposed to be 
working full time once they are back to their jobs.
It is interesting to observe the relationship between 
objective measures and values. Countries with high 
level of agreement with the statements “mothers 
should mainly look after children”, “pre-school children 
suffer if mother works”, “if jobs are scarce, men should 
take them” are the countries with lower availability of 
formal childcare and with fewer part-time job opportu-
nities. We also observe a positive correlation between 
more people agreeing with “being a housewife is as ful-
filling as …” and high levels of employment protection. 
Countries with higher employment protection are gen-
erally “dualist” and women are less likely to be in the 
protected sector and more likely to have less protected 
and less satisfying jobs. 
Values may be the causes but also the conse-
quences of different institutional settings: If women 
want to be at home and look after children, they are less 
likely to demand childcare services; if women do not 
face high availability of childcare and the possibility to 
work, this may tend to reinforce their beliefs. 
We can cluster the countries in four groups, which 
roughly correspond to different European geographical 
areas: a first group of Nordic countries with medium 
levels of employment protection, part-time diffusion 
and leave length but the highest availability of formal 
childcare and the lowest attachment to “traditional” 
values; a second group of Continental European coun-
tries with lower employment protection and short 
leaves, higher availability of part-time jobs and child-
care and low attachment to traditional values; a third 
group of Eastern European countries with medium 
employment protection, little part-time and childcare, 
longer leaves; a fourth group of Mediterranean coun-
tries with high employment protection, medium level 
of childcare, part-time and leave length, and strong 
attachment to traditional values.
34
RESEARCH REPORT
ifo DICE Report 2 / 2017 June Volume 15
RESULTS
In Figure 1 we plot the coeffi-
cients  associated with the 
“postponement premia” in 
each country. With the excep-
tion of very few countries, hav-
ing the first child at a later age is 
associated with a positive and 
statistically significant wage 
premium. In more detail, we 
see that the countries where 
the premium is negative or 
non-significant are mostly Nor-
dic countries (Sweden, Iceland, 
Norway, Denmark) and a few 
Eastern European ones (Slove-
nia, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithua-
nia). In all the Continental and 
Southern countries, the premia 
are always positive.
The three countries with 
higher premia belong to three 
different clusters: Germany 
(Continental), Poland (Eastern) 
and Portugal (Mediterranean). 
Nevertheless they share some 
common features in terms of 
country indicators: Poland and 
Portugal are traditionally 
Catholic countries; with rela-
tive low shares of part-time 
jobs, and very traditional val-
ues. Portugal, in addition, has 
very strict employment protec-
tion legislation, and Poland a 
very low share of childcare 
availability. We can expect that 
in those countries reconcilia-
tion of family and work is quite 
hard, and that there is “pressure” from social norms on 
focusing on childrearing after having a child, which 
could lead highly educated and/or motivated women to 
wait longer to become mothers so as not to waste their 
human capital and to enjoy higher re-entering wages 
after a maternity leave. This is also true for other coun-
tries which show positive though slightly lower premia, 
such as the Mediterranean European ones – Italy, Spain, 
Greece and Cyprus – and the more Catholic and tradi-
tional Ireland, Romania and Malta. Germany, on the 
other hand, has very long paid maternity leaves but low 
enrollment of children under age three in childcare and 
also one of the highest gender wage gaps. 
In Table 1 we report the coefficient of the second 
model, where we regress the premia estimated in 
model (1) on indicators of countries’ policies and cul-
ture. We do as many regressions as the number of cho-
sen indicators including one indicator at a time. A posi-
tive sign means that higher values of the indicators are 
associated with higher premia for waiting longer to 
become a mother. In the Table, each cell corresponds to 
a different regression. In Figures 3 and 4, we report the 
cross plots between the wage premia and the statisti-
cally significant indicators.
When considering objective indicators, we see that 
the proportion of children aged between zero and three 
attending formal care and the length of maternity and 
parental leave have a negative effect on the wage 
premia, suggesting that in countries which offer more 
family-friendly services (more childcare and more paid 
parental leave), the premia to have a child at older ages 
is lower, or the other way around, the penalty to become 
mother at younger ages is less. 
When we focus on the indicators capturing culture 
and values, we see that three of them, namely the pro-
portion of individuals agreeing that a pre-school child 
suffers if the mother works, the proportion of individu-
als agreeing that if jobs are scarce men should have the 
22
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priority, and the proportion of individuals attending 
religious services at least once a week have positive 
effects on the premia, and thus a higher value of these 
indicators increase the premia to become mother at a 
later age. Countries with higher values of these indica-
tors can be considered as “more conservative” and 
indeed they are mostly Mediterranean countries (Italy, 
Portugal, Cyprus, Greece and Malta) and/or the most 
Catholic ones (Ireland and Poland). Of course these cul-
tural values are associated with other objective indica-
tors (e.g., negatively with proportion of children 
enrolled in childcare).
Finally, when focusing on composite indices we see 
that both the fields of action index and the target fields 
index have a negative effect on the premia. Thus, higher 
values of the indices, representing more family-friendly 
societies, are associated with lower premia for late-age 
mothers. Similarly the Gender Development Index, 
whose higher values represent a more gender equal 
society based on health, knowledge and living stand-
ards, is negatively associated with the premia.
CONCLUSION 
Given the several challenges that women with children 
face in the labour market, late motherhood may rep-
resent a way for women to delay the labour market 
costs of having children. This article represents a first 
attempt to investigate the differences in the labour 
market returns from motherhood postponement in 
Europe (“postponement premia”) using highly compa-
rable EU data. Our analysis shows a high variability in 
the “postponement premia” related to wages. In some 
countries delaying the birth of the first child by one 
year may produce an increase in wages as high as 2.5% 
(Germany or Poland), while in other countries the effect 
can be negative. We provide some evidence that these 
premia are related to the policies and institutions in 
place in the different countries. Namely, the wage gains 
from postponing motherhood are larger in countries 
lacking family-friendly policies and in more traditional 
societies, and smaller in countries promoting higher 
gender equality.
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Source: Our computations.
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Table 1
Regression of wage “postponement premia” on countries’ characteristics
Indicators Estimates Observations
Strictness of employment protection 0.00123 26
(0.34)
Unadjusted Gender Pay Gap -0.0000899 31
(-0.32)
Part-time jobs diffusion -0.0000116 30
(-0.12)
Parental leave arrangements -0.0000837* 26
(-2.13)
Early formal childcare availability -0.000223* 31
(-2.31)
Pre-school children suffer with working mother 0.000662*** 31
(4.31)
Being housewife is as fulfilling as working -0.0000734 31
(-0.45)
When jobs are scarce men should have the priority 0.000462* 31
(2.72)
Age norm 0.000324 21
(1.01)
Leave - sharing 0.0000674 20
(0.45)
Religious participation 0.000248* 31
(2.52)
Target fields index -0.000455*** 19
(-4.50)
Fields of action index -0.000516** 19
(-3.45)
Gender Development Index -0.160* 31
(-2.30)
t-statistics in parentheses, + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Note. “Estimates” are the estimated coefficients from a regression of country-specific postponement premia 
on the indicators listed in column 1, obtained using WLS (weighted by the inverse of the standard error of the 
generated dependent variable). The number of observations may differ across regressions depending on the 
availability of the indicators.
Source:
